Disrupting The Wall Street World View

Bond Market Will Never Be the Same After Goldman: 

Michael Lewis

Commentary by Michael Lewis

April 22 (Bloomberg) -- If you happen to be sitting on the Goldman Sachs bond-trading floor life must feel horribly unfair.

You did nothing worse than live by the ethical assumptions of your market -- any money-making event short of obviously illegal is admirable -- and now your own grandfather thinks you’re some kind of monster. Your world feels upside down: What was right is now wrong; what was good is now bad; what once felt like winning now feels like losing.

You are probably wondering: What next? What will the angry rabble -- all those ordinary people who can never really understand your business -- now demand that you explain to them, so they can disapprove of you all over again?


A few possibilities:

No. 1 -- Full knowledge of the inner workings of your proprietary trading desk.
In particular: the moment-to-moment dealings of your correlations traders from late 2004 (when they first exploited American International Group’s idiotic willingness to sell cheap insurance on pools of subprime mortgage loans) until the end of 2007, when they would have taken most of their profits from the total collapse of the subprime bond markets.


Your bosses claim to have lost almost $100 million on the Abacus trade for which your firm is being sued. This seems, to put it mildly, disingenuous. In March 2007, the time of this particular Abacus trade, your prop traders were already short the subprime market. Would they really have taken a naked long position in a deal you helped to construct precisely so that it would fail without offsetting in some other way on their books?


Ritual Sacrifice


Sadly, it will not suffice to offer up Fabrice Tourre as a ritual sacrifice. No one is going to accept a then 27-year-old Frenchman, whose job was apparently to keep sweet the patsies on the other end of your trades, as the world’s authority on your trading positions.

His name isn’t even on the top of the list of Goldman traders listed on the $2 billion Abacus deal for which you are being sued. The name on top of that document is Jonathan Egol. Egol appears to have been the bond trader at the center of your Abacus program. The same Jonathan Egol who told fellow traders in 2006 -- a year before this transaction -- that the subprime market was doomed.

The public eventually will ask: Who is Jonathan Egol and what exactly was his game?

No. 2 -- A far better understanding of your relations with the inaptly named “CDO manager.”

Clearly Clueless

In this case the manager was ACA Management, but there were other CDO managers at least as pliable as ACA. The SEC suit charges you with using ACA as a shill: the end investors in your CDO assumed that it was ACA’s job to figure out whether the bonds inside the CDO were intelligent investments.
But ACA quite clearly had no idea what it was doing -- and you quite clearly understood that.
The telling details here are the e-mails between your French salesman and ACA, in which ACA feels it needs to understand exactly what John Paulson’s interest are in this new CDO. Paulson, who had done a great deal of analysis on the underlying bonds, was of course picking the ones he wanted to see inside the CDO. (Hard to understand why it didn’t disturb you that he was even in the room, by the way, but that’s another conversation.)

The SEC accuses you of lying to ACA, by suggesting Paulson was a long investor in the deal when he was in fact selling the deal short.

Good From Bad

But what’s interesting here is what you appear to take for granted: that ACA has no talent for evaluating the bonds picked by Paulson. After all, if ACA was doing its job it wouldn’t have cared one way or the other what Paulson (then a little-known hedge fund manager) was up to. ACA would have known which bonds were good and which were bad, and picked the good ones.

In their anxiety about Paulson’s motives we can all glimpse their incompetence. They want to know that Paulson has an interest in picking the good ones because they themselves have no clue which ones they are.
But if a CDO manager had no independent ability to select the bonds inside a CDO what, please explain to us, was his financial function? Why did you select ACA to manage your deal?

No. 3 -- A far better sense of why, and when, you ceased completely to concern yourself with the consequences of your actions.

The masses will be curious to know, for instance, how you became blinded to the very simple difference between right and wrong. The more moralistic among them will ask the question mainly to fuel their own outrage; the more tactical will ask the question because they sense that the financial system doesn’t function unless you have the incentive to think in these terms - - and you clearly do not.

Soul-Changing

What begins as an effort to change your business may well end up as an attempt to change your soul.
Among the many likely consequences of the SEC’s decision to sue Goldman Sachs for fraud is a social upheaval in the bond markets.

Indeed, the social effects of the SEC’s action will almost certainly be greater than the narrow legal ones. Just as there was a time when people could smoke on airplanes, or drive drunk without guilt, there was a time when a Wall Street bond trader could work with a short seller to create a bond to fail, trick and bribe the ratings companies into blessing the bond, then sell the bond to a slow-witted German without having to worry if anyone would ever know, or care, what he’d just done.

That just changed.

(Michael Lewis, most recently author of the best-selling “The Big Short,” is a columnist for Bloomberg News. The opinions he expresses are his own.)

Click on “Send Comment” button in sidebar display to send a letter to the editor.

To contact the writer of this column: Michael Lewis at mlewis1@bloomberg.net
Last Updated: April 21, 2010 21:00 EDT

The financial meltdown wasn't a mistake – it was a con

Now we know the truth. The financial meltdown wasn't a mistake – it was a con

Hiding behind the complexities of our financial system, banks and other institutions are being accused of fraud and deception, with Goldman Sachs just the latest in the spotlight. This has become the most pressing election issue of all

"The cases not only have a lot in common – using financial complexity allegedly to deceive and then using so-called independent experts to validate the deception (lawyers, accountants, credit rating agencies, "portfolio selection agents," etc etc ) – but they also show how interconnected the financial system is. In Iceland Citigroup and Deutsche Bank covered the margin calls of distressed Icelandic business borrowers, deepening the crisis. Lehman uses the lightly regulated London markets and two independent British experts to validate that their "Repo 105s" were "genuine" trades and not their own in-house liability. The American authorities pursued a Swiss bank over aiding and abetting US nationals to evade tax."

EXCERPT, Read  Entire Article HERE.

Looters in Loafers from the NYTimes

Op-Ed Columnist
By PAUL KRUGMAN

Published: April 18, 2010
  
Looters in Loafers

 "...the S.E.C. is charging that Goldman created and marketed securities that were deliberately designed to fail, so that an important client could make money off that failure. That’s what I would call looting." 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/opinion/19krugman.html?src=me&ref=general

Just How Sorry Are They?

 Measuring Wall Street Apologetics

 The parade of bankers called to account for the financial crisis continued last week when Kerry K. Killinger, head of Washington Mutual, the largest bank ever to fail, apologized, sort of, as have many before him. But he also said that his firm “should have been given a chance.” Here are some of those mea culpa moments.

Read their quotes in today's New York Times

Angelo R. Mozilo
Co-founder, former chairman and chief executive, Countrywide Financial

TOTAL COMPENSATION $530.9 million.

Kenneth D. Lewis
Former chairman and chief executive, Bank of America

TOTAL COMPENSATION $251.5 million.

Kerry K. Killinger
Former chief executive, Washington Mutual

TOTAL COMPENSATION $95.7 million

E. Stanley O’Neal
Former chairman and chief executive, Merrill Lynch

TOTAL COMPENSATION $201.9 million.

 
Lloyd C. Blankfein
Chairman and chief executive, Goldman Sachs

TOTAL COMPENSATION $391.2 million

Richard S. Fuld
Former chairman and chief executive, Lehman Brothers

TOTAL COMPENSATION $167.5 million.

Charles O. Prince III
Former chairman and chief executive, Citigroup

TOTAL COMPENSATION $132.7 million. 

James E. Cayne
Former chairman, Bear Stearns

TOTAL COMPENSATION $424.3 million.

 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/weekinreview/18dash.html

Reblog from WSJ Goldman Sachs in the Hot Seat

Goldman Sachs Charged With Fraud

SEC Alleges Firm Misled Investors on Securities Linked to Subprime Mortgages; Major Escalation in Showdown With Wall Street

By GREGORY ZUCKERMAN, SUSANNE CRAIG and SERENA NG

Goldman Sachs Group Inc.—one of the few Wall Street titans to thrive during the financial crisis—was charged with deceiving clients by selling them mortgage securities secretly designed by a hedge-fund firm run by John Paulson, who made a killing betting on the housing market's collapse.


Goldman vigorously denied the Securities and Exchange Commission's civil charges, setting up the biggest clash between Wall Street and regulators since junk-bond king Drexel Burnham Lambert succumbed to a criminal insider-trading investigation in the 1980s, helping to define the era. "The SEC's charges are completely unfounded in law and fact," Goldman said in a statement, promising to "contest them and defend the firm and its reputation."

Excerpt: Profiting From the Crash

In his 2009 book, Wall Street Journal reporter Greg Zuckerman was the first to lay out how Mr. Paulson approached banks, including Goldman and Bear Sterns among others , with the proposal that they create securities of sub-prime mortgages that he could bet against. It is those trades that are at the heart of the Securities and Exchange Commission's case against Goldman.

The civil charges against Goldman and one of its star traders, 31-year-old Fabrice Tourre, represent the government's strongest attack yet on the Wall Street dealmaking that preceded, and some say precipitated, the financial crisis that gripped the nation and the world. Goldman's shares fell 13%, one of the steepest slides since the firm went public in 1999, erasing some $12 billion of market capitalization.

The SEC lawsuit likely strengthens the position of President Barack Obama as he tries to push financial-overhaul legislation through Congress. He vowed Friday to veto any version of the bill that doesn't bring the derivatives market "under control."

Regulators say Goldman allowed Mr. Paulson's firm, Paulson & Co., to help design a financial investment known as a CDO, or collateralized debt obligation, built out of a specific set of risky mortgage assets—essentially setting up the CDO for failure. Paulson then bet against it, while investors in the CDO weren't told of Paulson's role or intentions.

"The product was new and complex, but the deception and conflicts are old and simple," said Robert Khuzami, the SEC's enforcement chief.

Mr. Paulson and his firm aren't named as defendants. The hedge-fund firm said in a statement that it wasn't involved in marketing the bonds to third parties. "Goldman made the representations, Paulson did not," Mr. Khuzami said.

Mr. Paulson took home $4 billion in 2007 for correctly betting on a housing collapse.

View Interactive

Take a look at some famous cases that allege serious fraud at major financial companies.

The SEC said Mr. Tourre was "principally responsible" for piecing together the bonds and touting them to investors. According to the SEC, Mr. Tourre wrote in an email shortly before the bonds were sold that "the whole building is about to collapse anytime now." He described himself in the email as the "Only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab … standing in the middle of all these complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all of the implications of those monstruosities!!!"

But he was hardly alone, the SEC alleges: The deals were signed off by senior Goldman executives, though the SEC didn't specify how high up it believes the knowledge extended.

In the past year, Goldman—the most profitable firm on Wall Street—has emerged as a symbol of excess. The taxpayer-funded rescue of the markets helped catapult Goldman to a huge profit rebound last year and stirred resentment of the firm's bonuses. Goldman paid out about $16 billion in compensation to employees in 2009.
And late last year in a profile in London's Sunday Times, Goldman's chief executive, Lloyd Blankfein, described himself as "doing God's work," a remark that Goldman later explained was made in jest. Still, the quip inflamed Goldman critics who said it showed the firm was tone deaf about concerns over its business practices and rich pay.

Goldman is one of the few financial firms the U.S. government has accused of misleading investors in the subprime-mortgage debacle, although it is one of many that created and sold securities that cratered when the housing market collapsed.

View Full Image

Reuters

The new Goldman Sachs Group headquarters in New York's lower Manhattan.

The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 116.38, or 1.04%, to 11028.19, as investors worried that other financial firms could be on a collision course with the SEC over Wall Street's behavior during the crisis.

It has been a brutal week for Goldman. The SEC's charges against the firm came just days after The Wall Street Journal reported that prosecutors are investigating Goldman director Rajat Gupta on suspicion that he provided inside information to the Galleon Group, the hedge fund founded by Raj Rajaratnam now at the center of the biggest insider-trading probe in decades.


The deal at the center of the SEC suit came as Goldman and other firms were deeply involved in making, buying and building complex investments out of subprime loans, just as the market for those loans was beginning to weaken perilously. Critics of such deals say they enriched the firms but magnified what became the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.

As the housing market sank in 2007 and 2008, investors in the deal, known as Abacus 2007-AC1, suffered losses of more than $1 billion, according to the SEC. The sinking market gave Paulson a profit of about $1 billion. Goldman was paid about $15 million for structuring the bonds and pitching them to investors. Goldman is a major trader of stocks and bonds on behalf of Paulson

In a statement, Goldman said it suffered a $90 million loss on the deal. Goldman said investors were provided with extensive information about the securities in the portfolio. Mr. Tourre, the trader facing civil charges as part of the SEC action, couldn't be reached to comment. He works as executive director in Goldman's international unit.

Analysts said the suit could cost Goldman business and even threaten its executives. "Someone must 'fall on their swords' for the devastating decline in this company's persona," wrote Richard Bove, an analyst with Rochdale Securities.

Goldman and Mr. Tourre both received Wells notices from the SEC in recent months indicating that the staff of the agency could recommend action against the parties in the case, a person familiar with the matter said. Goldman isn't required to disclose the Wells notice if it believed it wasn't a material event. The notices don't always lead to charges or fines.

Journal Community

Goldman employees were stunned by the suit, even though Goldman has been cooperating with the SEC's probe of CDOs. Traders at the company's headquarters in lower Manhattan stopped working when the headline flashed across TV screens.

Goldman has vehemently denied putting its own interests ahead of its clients.' In a letter to shareholders earlier this month, Mr. Blankfein and President Gary Cohn said: "Our goal was, and is, to be in a position to make markets for our clients while managing our risk within prescribed limits." But it was common knowledge among Goldman executives that the firm created mortgage bonds so clients could bet against housing.
Other firms also used CDOs to offset risk taken on through credit-default swaps with hedge-fund clients, including Deutsche Bank AG, according to people familiar with the matter.

Goldman and Paulson have worked together ever since the hedge-fund firm was established in 1994. By mid-2006, Mr. Paulson and his fund had purchased protection on billions of dollar of potentially toxic mortgages, and he wanted to expand his bearish wager.

View Full Image

Reuters

'CEO Lloyd Blankfein has drawn heat for Goldman's rich pay and profits in the wake of the taxpayer bailout of the financial system.

Graphic: See an example of how a mortgage CDO is made.

Goldman and Deutsche Bank were among the firms that agreed to put together deals for Paulson. The fund chose a list of securities to form the foundation of the CDOs, zeroing in on those it saw as particularly risky. In at least some deals, potential buyers of the mortgage bonds were consulted, along with credit-rating agencies, people familiar with the transactions say.

In contrast, one senior banker at Bear Stearns Cos. turned down the business. He questioned the propriety of selling deals to investors that a bearish client was involved in putting together, according to people familiar with the matter.

One investor who lost money on Abacus was German bank IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, the SEC said. A bank spokeswoman said it is aware of the suit and responded to SEC inquiries.

Middleman

How Goldman Sachs structured the deal under scrutiny. (Click on the image.)

 Another big loser: ACA Capital Ltd., which operated a bond insurer that insured a $909 million chunk of the CDO in return for a fee, according to the complaint. When the bond insurer imploded in late 2007, most of its Abacus-related risk wound up with ABN Amro Bank NV, the complaint said.

The Dutch bank, which agreed to cover ACA's obligations if the insurer couldn't pay, was later acquired by a group of banks that included Royal Bank of Scotland PLC. In 2008, RBS paid $840.9 million to Goldman to unwind the agreement. Goldman paid most of that money to Paulson, according to the SEC.

From 2004 to 2007, Goldman arranged about two dozen similarly named deals, according to rating-agency data. American International Group wrote credit protection on $6 billion of Abacus transactions before the insurer nearly collapsed in 2008, though not the deal detailed in the SEC's suit, according to documents reviewed by the Journal. Last year, AIG unwound most of its Abacus-related swaps with Goldman, losing $2 billion.

A 65-page marketing document for Abacus 2007-AC1 reviewed by The Wall Street Journal described the deal as a $2 billion synthetic CDO based on a pool of residential mortgage assets "selected by" another unit of ACA. The logos of Goldman and ACA were printed on nearly every page.

SEC v. Goldman Sachs

The lawsuit suggests "senior level management" at Goldman was aware of the Abacus transaction and Paulson's connection to the deal. "Goldman is effectively working an order for Paulson to buy protection on specific layers of" the deal's "capital structure," according to excerpts of a 2007 internal memo included with the suit. The Goldman committee that was sent the memo included senior-level management, the SEC said.
According to the SEC, Mr. Tourre misled ACA officials about Paulson's role, saying the firm had invested $200 million in hopes the CDO would rise. ACA and Paulson chose the 90 pools of mortgage assets used to create Abacus, the SEC said.


In a statement, Goldman said it "never represented to ACA" that Paulson was investing in hopes the values would rise. People close to the firm said officials saw no need to disclose to investors that Mr. Paulson had a hand in creating the portfolio or was taking a bearish position.
Abacus 2007-AC1 was issued in April 2007. By October, more than 80% of the underlying mortgage securities in the deal had been downgraded, reflecting the housing market's deepening turmoil. A total of 99% were downgraded by January 2008, according to the SEC.

—Aaron Lucchetti contributed to this report.

Write to Gregory Zuckerman at gregory.zuckerman@wsj.com, Susanne Craig at susanne.craig@wsj.com and Serena Ng at serena.ng@wsj.com